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I.
The First World War turned out to be an unexpected windfall to Japan’s financial
situation  and  its  imperial  ambitions.  Formerly  a  debtor  nation  plagued  with  chronic
capital  and specie  shortage, it  found this situation  radically  reversed due to diminished
competition of Europe's  belligerent powers and the consequential (and unprecendented)
demand for Japanese products.1 Beet sugar,  in  one example,  more or less  disappeared
from the world markets, thereby greatly increasing the cane sugar price and the profits of
the Taiwan sugar producers —especially  the Suzuki concern’s sugar interests and their
banks,  the  semigovernmental  Bank  of  Taiwan.  In  1916,  exactly  when  the  Terauchi
Cabinet went into office, the war gave way to a veritable boost to the Japanese economy.
It is instructive to see the latter in the context of rise of the United States. When the latter
experienced its boom, it  was ready to absorb more Japanese exports than ever before.
Within  Japan itself,  domestic  producers were able  to fill  the market  for  many  hight-
technology  goods,  formerly  imported  from  European  countries.  From  whatever
perspective,  this  evolution was no  less  short of spectacular.  Between 1914 and 1918,
1 For a more intricate picture of the evolution of Japanese foreign trade during the war,
see: Mark Metzler, Lever of Empire: The International Gold Standard and the Crisis of
Liberalism in Prewar Japan (Berkeley – Los Angeles - London, 2006), pp. 91ff.
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domestic  manufacturing  increased  by  54 percent  in  inflatioin  adjusted terms;  exports
increased by three times in money terms and by 47 percent in value.2
Through  the  ingenious  financial  technologies  of  its  so-called  special  banks
(tokushu gink ), notably the Yokohama Specie Bank and the Japan Industrial
Bank, Japan had furthermore build  up a very large gold reserve, in the form of foreign-
held  currencies.3 In  1916, ¥77 million  of gold  poured into  the country;  in  1917,  the
number  rose to an astonishing  ¥236 million.4 According  to Inoue Junnosuke, the war
economy  had  supplied  Japan  with  enough  financial  resources  to  potentially  all  its
outstanding debts (both foreign and domestic)  —an outlook that was in sharp contrast
with the prewar debt, which stood at an estimated ¥1,941 million,  equivalent to roughly
£200 million, and of which almost three quarters was foreign debt!5
At the same time, the war marked a remarkable change in European presence on
the  Asian  mainland.  Most  prominently,  it  forced  Great-Britain  to  concentrate on the
European theater of combat, and abandon its aggressive economic and political acitivities
in  China.  First,  London chose for the position of temporary wartime expedient,  but  it
soon saw its position endangered by the assertive policies of both the United States and
Japan. What was at stake was the politics of 'exclusive rights' the European powers had
wrought upon China, and which they regarded as immutable and inalienable. Ultimately,
2 After: Metzler, Lever of Empire, p. 95; George Cyril Allen, Japan’s Economic Policy
(New York, 1980), p. 101; Nihon Gink Tkeikyoku 	
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 Hundred Year Statistics of the Japanese Economy meiji / ik honp shuy
keizai tkei (Tokyo, 1966), p. 106, p. 120.
3 See, for a discussion of ‘specie held abroad’, chapter ?????.
4 Nihon Gink Tkeikyoku, Hundred Year Statistics, p.166; 194; 278; 298-299
(nakijken op precisie!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!). 
5 Allen, Japan’s Economic Policy, p. 22; Inoue Junnosuke, Problems of the Japanese
Exchange, 1914-1926 (London, 1931), p. 229. It is clear that his debt burden was
incurred by the choice for industrialization and military build-up on the one hand, and the
costly strategy of overseas empire on the other. Especially the latter did not bring a return
in terms of foreign exchange earnings, because of the abysmal state of the colonial
economies, which demanded further investment and thus, ultimately, foreign borrowing.
Profits within this embryonic Japanese empire (mainly) came in Japanese yen, and this
due to colonial administration. As we have seen in the former chapter, colonial
economies were designed as subsidiaries to the economy of the Japanese mainland.
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the conclusion of the war heralded a permanent  transformation of British power in the
world:  a transfer  of both economic  and political  predominance  in  favor of the United
States and the powerful and apparently universalist vocabulary of the 'Open Door'.
Beyond doubt, this shift  in the balance of power in the Far East was the main
reason for Japanese policy makers not to follow the American example and liquidate its
debts, but instead to engage proactively in foreign lending itself. Although it is not very
wellknown, Japan lent to Great-Britain,  France, and Russia in the period between 1915
and 1918.6 For all their uniqueness,  however, we will  not go into their details.  As has
been sufficiently  made clear by It Masanao, these loans were primarily7 economic in
nature,  and  stemmed  from  problems  associated  with  suspended,  or  limited,  specie
exchange. This was especially the case after 1917, when the United States too placed an
embargo on the export of gold.8 It appears that Tokyo faced the prospect of not being able
to remit its growing trade surpluses, and thus decided to engage in lending in an effort to
‘fund  its  own trade’.9 Especially  imports of raw cotton from India  were an important
point,  for  they defined  the boundaries  of repatriating  trade surpluses  with the United
States in  gold.  Gold shipments were immediately transferred to Indian wholesalers,  in
6 Nihon gink hyakunenshi iinkai 
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nihon teikoku shugi to shihon yushutsu (Tokyo, 1976), pp. 29ff..
7 Arguably, they also functioned as a way to (zie Simon Bytheway, met verwijzing naar
Mark Metzler)....?????????????
8 This gave rise to some quite intricate financial technology. For one, the U.S. gold
embargo caused the Japanese government to accumulate payments in the accounts of the
Yokohama Specie Bank branch office in New York When the latter experienced
difficulties of maintaining advances to Japanese exporters, the Bank of Japan and the
Japanese government purchased the balances to YSB’s credit, and thus acquired funds for
furthering the economic expansion. Obviously, these purchases resulted in an sharp
increases of the BOJ’s note issuing, and as such precipitated the postwar inflation and
consequent conflict of the so-called ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ policies. See, in this respect,
authorititavely: Metzler, Lever of Empire, pp. 115-158.
9 Itﬃ Masanao 9:&;, /
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seisaku (Japan’s international finance and financial policies) (Nagoya, 1989).
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order to enable further imports and thus sustain Japan’s furious economic growth. In this
scheme, extending credit to the European powers was one piece in the larger puzzle of
facilitating trade under the difficult wartime conditions.10
There were, however, also other loan schemes, and these carried all the hallmarks
of a  pronounced political  interest.  In  the period  between 1917 and  1918,  a  series  of
mysterious loans negotiated between Japanese middleman Nishihara Kamezﬃ CDEF
and the government of warlord Duan Qirui GHI amounted to the fabulous amount of
¥145,000,000. Although reporting about these loans at the time was confused to say the
least, we now know that there existed definite and close relationships between Nishihara
Kamezﬃ  on the one hand,  and the Terauchi  Cabinet  in  Tokyo,  in  the person of then
Minister of Finance Shﬃda Kazue JK
3L
in particular.11
Analyzing the Nishihara loans in their geopolitical and historical particularity and
isolation is,  however,  to miss  the point.  In what  context(s) were these infamous  loans
raised?  What  was,  for  instance  the  nature  of  their  geopolitical  climate  and  their
international institutional character? Next, in what respect did the Nishihara loans differ
from  earlier,  more  'official'  instances  of  yen  diplomacy?  In  what  respect  did  they
represent a break with former  administrations,  and, more importantly,  did their  exist  a
broad consensus about their objectives and appropriateness? And not in the least: how did
China's turbulent politics contribute to their ill fate?
II.
Let  us  first  turn to  the  broader  international  context,  more  specifically  some
remarkable  events  American  politics  went  through  at  the  end  of the  nineteenth  and
10 For more information on the institutional characteristics of the foreign lending scheme,
see: ﬂkurashﬃ hensan 
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beginning of the twentieth century. As pointed out in the introduction, the U.S. choice for
the gold standard cannot be seen separate from an 'internationalist'  strand in  American
politics, stressing the need for greater American involvement in international affairs, not
by  means  of  heavy-handed  European  style  military  might  (sic.),  but  through  the
beneficial means of free trade and commerce. The U.S. government therefore sponsored
the  establishment  of a  Commission  on  International  Exchange whose  aim  it  was  to
investigate the possibility of erecting gold-exchange standards in, among others, Panama,
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Mexico. Their respective currencies would this time
not be based on the pound sterling (the system pioneered by the British in India),12 but on
the  United  States  gold  dollar,  in  other  words  centered  around  New  York.  The
technicalities of their realization have been well documented in existing literature.13
China  remained  however  the  nec  plus  ultra in  the  great  power  scramble  for
concessions and favorable trade agreements. It was, unfortunately for U.S. policy makers,
12 American policies were indeed so obviously modelled after the British example in
India that the economist John Maynard Keynes regarded them with profound contempt:
in dealing with her dependencies, the United States has 'imitated, almost slavishly, India'.
In turn, this criticism did not go unnoted, as demonstrated in the following review by
Kemmerer:
'[Mr. Keynes' view] cannot be substantiated. The Philippines have a simpler and
purer form of the gold-echange standard than has India. The Indian system has
various complicating elements: the sale of council bills for fiscal purposes; the
paper money reserve, whose functions decidedly overlap those of the gold
standard reserve; and the absence of anything like as rigid and automatic
requirements as the Philippines possess for adjusting the monetary circulation to
the norms demanded by a strict gold standard.'
John Maynard Keynes, Indian Currency and Finance (London, 1913), p. 27. E.W.
Kemmerer, 'Review: Keynes' Indian Currency and Finance', The Quarterly Journal of
Economics 28:2 (February 1914), p. 375.
13 J.H. Hollander, 'The Finances of Porto Rico', Political Science Quarterly 16:6
(December 1901), pp. 553-581; E. W. Kemmerer, 'The Establishment of the Gold
Exchange Standard in the Philippines', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 19, No.
4. (Aug., 1905), pp. 585-609;  idem, 'A Gold Standard for the Straits Settlements',
Political Science Quarterly 19:4 (December 1904), pp. 636-649; idem, 'A Gold Standard
for the Straits Settlements II', Political Science Quarterly 21:4 (December 1906), pp.
663-698.
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also a country where its bargaining position had been substantially weakened. Especially
the  Japanese  victory over  China  in  1894-1895 had  effectively  eroded the  diplomatic
leverage of the Chinese government. Towards the end of the nineteenth century, several
European countries started to exploit China's  thwarted capability of resisting aggressive
demands and circumvent  the earlier  relative  equality of trade conditions based on so-
called 'most-favored-nation' clauses (originally embedded in the treaties of 1842-1844).14
Arguably  a strategy first  pioneered  by  France,15 it  consisted  of demanding  exclusive
concessions,  especially  in mining  and railway building.  Once granted to one power, it
was  obviously  virtually  impossible  to  grant  them to one or more other  powers:  such
concessions thus physically  destroyed opportunities for equal investment, and were, by
consequence, capable of destroying equal trading opportunities as well.
The American reaction consisted of the wellknown policy of the Open Door.16
The 'First Open Door Note' (September 6, 1899), allegedly prepared by Secretary of State
John Hay and addressed to Andrew White, was a specific reaction to German exclusivist
claims  with regard to  the the bay of  Jiaozhou  bcd and  the adjacent  Shandong
territory, but effectively conveys the Open Door's essence:
[...]
1) [Each power will] in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within
any so-called 'sphere of interest' or leased territory it may have in China.
14 Earl H. Prichard, 'The Origins of the Most-Favored-Nation and the Open Door Policies
in China', The Far Eastern Quarterly 1:2 (February 1942), pp. 161-172, esp. pp. 167ff.
15 Idem, p. 171; Payson Jackson Treat, The Far East: A Political and Diplomatic History
(New York & London, 1935), p. 323.
16 For some early overviews, see: Shutaro Tomimas, The Open-door Policy and the
Territorial Integrity of China (New York, 1919); Mingchien Joshua Bau, The Open Door
Doctrine in Relation to China (New York, 1923). On the Open Door's origins and early
history, see: Paul A. Varg, 'William Woodville Rockhill and the Open Door Notes', The
Journal of Modern History 24:4 (December 1952), pp. 375-380; Tyler Dennett, 'The
Open Door Policy as Intervention', Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 168 (July 1933), pp.78-83; Raymond A Esthus, 'The Changing Concept of
the Open Door, 1899-1910', The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 46:3 (December
1959), pp. 435-454.
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2) [T]he Chinese treaty tariff of the time shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to
all such ports as are within said 'sphere of interest' (unless they be 'free ports'), no matter
to what nationality it may belong,  and that duties so leviable shall be collected by the
Chinese Government.
3) [Each  power  will]  levy  no  higher  harbor  dues  on  vessels  of  another  nationality
frequenting any port in such 'sphere' than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality,
and no higher railroad charges over lines built, controlled or operated within its 'sphere'
on  merchandise  belonging  to  citizens  or  subjects  of  other  nationalities  transported
through such 'sphere'  than shall be levied on similar merchandise belonging  to its own
nationals transported over equal distances.
[...]17
The impact of the Open Door idea was enormous. Formulated in the terminology
of freedom, equality of privilege and progress, it  managed to mobilize not only public
opinion,18 but also —importantly— key players in high finance.19 Its novelty was thereby
not so much the values it  claimed to incorporate, but its rhetorical force as enlightened
self-interest. There was, some would say obviously, a strong political aspect to American
aid to China.20 The Open Door endorsed and justified a partnership of governance and
17 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1899 (Washington,
1899), pp. 129-130.
18 One cannot possibly exhaustively list all laudatios of the Open Door policy. For some
examples, see: Frederick McCormick, 'The Open Door', Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 39 (January 1912), pp. 56-61; Earl H. Prichard,
'The Origins of the Most-Favored Nation and the Open Door Policies in China', The Far
Eastern Quarterly 1:2 (February 1942), pp. 161-172.
19
'[...] Economic institutions and reform organizations interacted with each other and
together penetrated China. The people involved in them shared cultural conceptions,
political philosophies and bureaucratic backgrounds; they had common outlooks, goals
and destinies. In the combination of its parts, not in any single statement, tactic, or
motive, lies an understanding of the Open Door in action'. Jerry Israel, '“For God, for
China and for Yale” —The Open Door in Action', The American Historical Review 75:3
(February, 1970), p. 796.
20 This is well documented by: L. L. T'ang (Thung Liang Lee) and M. S. Miller, 'The
Political Aspect of International Finance in Russia and China', Economica 13 (March
1925), pp. 69-88. In a similar vein, Paul Reinsch, one of the Open Door's supporters but
quintessentially a modern imperialist, once explained the Monroe Doctrine as 'an
7.
finance bent  upon conquering the 'mythical'  China  market.21 Frequently,  a financier  as
influential as Thomas Lamont would strike a patriotic  chord, stress his indifference to
profits, and his dedication to America's superior cause. The American cause proved also
hard to resist.  Appealing  to a  sort of multinational  cooperation,  the Jenks  mission  to
China in 1904 was an attempt to bring China on a gold-exchange standard by means of
establishing  an overseas specie reserve held by all international partners. The mission's
eventual failure  was largely due to external circumstances.  The renewed rise in  silver
prices (culminating between 1905-1907)22 had lifted the pressure on gold payments, thus
further shriveling  the Qing government's  already limited preoccupation with monetary
reform. 
In any case, it certainly did not destroy America's appetite for the Chinese market.
In order to befriend the Chinese government and as an an apparent symbol of its peaceful
ambitions, it  remitted a portion of the Boxer Indemnity to China in 1908.23 In the same
period, U.S. policy makers cleverly  exploited disputes concerning  railway concessions
among the European financial powers present in China (Great-Britain, France, Germany,
Belgium)  and pushed  —again— for international cooperation, this time with regard to
railroad  matters.  In 1910,  after  several  series  of protracted negotiations,  it  signed  an
agreement with respect to the establishment of a banking consortium with Great-Britain,
unconscious stroke of genius in statesmanship in that it has preserved South America for
us now that we are ready to enter into our possession'. Cited in: Noel Pugach, 'Making the
Open Door Work: Paul S. Reinsch in China, 1913-1919', The Pacific Historical Review
38:2 (May 1969), pp. 157-175.
21 Compare: Thomas McCormick, America's Quest for Informal Empire, 1893-1901
(Chicago, 1967); Charles S. Campbell Jr., Special Business Interests and the Open Door
Policy (New Haven, 1951).
22 Thereafter, a new period of decline set in. This has been very well documented by:
Edwin H. Kemmerer, 'The Recent Rise in the Price of Silver and Some of Its Monetary
Consequences', The Quarterly Journal of Economics 26:2 (February 1912), pp. 215-274.
Beyond doubt, this led him to his vision of a 'Pan-American Monetary Unity': idem, 'A
Proposal for Pan-American Monetary Unity', Political Science Quarterly 31:1 (March
1916), pp. 66-80.
23 For a very good treatment of this episode, see: Michael H. Hunt, 'The American
Remission of the Boxer Indemnity: A Reappraisal', The Journal of Asian Studies 31:3,
pp. 539-559.
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France and Germany (Russia and Japan were left  out of the agreement  until June 18,
1912 in  view of their  lack of financial  resources).24 Years later, it  was agreed that the
Consortium would lend the Chinese government gold bonds to the aggregate amount of
£25,000,000;  the  loan  was  to  be  secured  upon  the  entire  revenues  of  China's  salt
administration; and it was to be used mainly 1) for the payment of liabilities due by the
Chinese government to the powers (including several pre-consortium loans by Belgium
and Japan), and 2) various administrative reforms plus infrastructural improvement.
Around  1913,  soon  after  the  signing  of  the  final  agreement,  however,  the
reinvented  Open Door  policy  seemed  on the  verge  of  collapse.  Two  years  after  the
Revolution of 1911, China's political situation was more troubled than ever. The Manchu
empire disintegrated. It had fallen prey to warlords, who ruled their territories with the
sole aim of exacting tribute to fulfill  their obligations towards the imperial court and to
enrich themselves and their allies.  The central government  led by Yuan Shikai  efg
could hardly claim to possess much of a central administrative authority at all.  Insofar it
did  not  interfere  with the custom administration  —an institution originally  associated
with foreign financial interests and under foreign management—, it merely 'functioned as
a  guarantor  to  the  foreign  investor  for  the  maintenance  of  regular  interest  and
amortization  payment  on his  bonds'.25 Adding  to  the  problem of  Chinese  instability,
president Wilson's fateful decision to withdraw from the China Consortium exacarbated
the American  position (1913).26 As  a matter of fact,  it  only  convinced  the European
24 For a history of events leading to the agreement, see: E.W. Edwards, British
Diplomacy and Finance in China (Cambridge, 1987), esp. pp. 114-158; A. P. Winston,
'Chinese Finance under the Republic', The Quarterly Journal of Economics 30: 4 (August
1916), pp. 738-739;  'Frederick V. Field, American Participation in the China
Consortiums (Chicago, 1931), pp. 1-24. The latter also includes a list of participating
banking institutions: pp. 39-40. The sole Japanese bank in the consortium was (one
would almost say obviously) the Yokohama Specie Bank.
25 Kurt Bloch, 'Warlordism: A Transitory Stage in Chinese Government', The American
Journal of Sociology 43:5 (March 1938), p. 692.
26
'The conditions of the loan seem to us to touch very nearly the administrative
independence of China itself, and this administration does not feel that it ought, even by
implication, to be a party of those conditions. The responsibility on its part which would
be implied in requesting the bankers to undertake the loan might conceivably go to the
length in some unhappy contingency of forceful interference in the financial, and even
9.
powers and Japan that America was trying to create the impression that she was China's
only true confederate.27 Consequently,  they only hastened to tighten their grip  on their
respective  spheres of influence.  Last  but  not  least,  there was the changed geopolitical
situation.  Although,  with  the  outbreak  of  the  First  World  War,  The  U.S.  effectively
outmanoeuvred Great-Britain in East-Asia,28 it now faced a competitor who regarded his
advance into China's socio-economic fabric as vital to its own destiny.
III.
Japanese expressions of interest in an financial presence in China date from the
immediate aftermath of the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-195, but were then without much
institutional  substance.  It  appears  that  several  high  officials  (among  whom  Tomita
Tetsunosuke  hijkl , then governor of the Bank of Japan) pondered the idea of
establishing a Sino-Japanese Bank (nisshin ginkm nopq), with the aim of 'facilitating
the  commerce  between  the  two nations,  further  their  industrial  development,  among
the political affairs of that great Oriental State [...]'. Woodrow Wilson's reply to the
American group of the consortium's demand whether the administration's policy with
respect to the Consortium was to be the same as that of its predecessor. Cited in: Field,
American Participation in the China Consortiums, p. 111.
27 For Japanese opinions on the Open Door, see: Miwa Kimitada,'Japanese Opinions on
Woodrow Wilson in War and Peace', Monumenta Nipponica 22:3/4 (1967), pp. 368-389. 
28 Compare: K.C. Chan, 'British Policy in the Reorganization Loan to China 1912-1913',
Modern Asian Studies 5:4 (November 1964), pp. 355-372; Clarence B. Davis, 'Limits of
Effacement: Britain and the Problem of American Cooperation and Competition in
China, 1915-1917', The Pacific Historical Review 48:1 (February 1979), pp. 47-63; Harry
N. Scheiber, 'World War I as Entrepreneurial Opportunity: Willard Straight and the
American International Corporation', Political Science Quarterly 84:3 (September 1969),
pp. 486-511; William R. Braisted, 'China, the United States Navy, and the Bethlehem
Steel Company, 1909-1929', The Business History Review 42:1 (Spring 1968), pp. 50-66;
Michael H. Hunt, 'Americans in the China Market: Economic Opportunities and
Economic Nationalism, 1890s-1931', The Business History Review 51:3 (Autumn 1977),
pp. 277-307; George T. Mazuzan, ' “Our New Gold Goes Adventuring”: The American
International Corporation in China', The Pacific Historical Review 43:2 (May 1974), pp.
212-232.
10.
others by documentary bills  (nigawase tegata rstuv, cf. supra), and join forces in
order to develop the commercial situation of all Far Eastern countries.29 At the time of its
formulation, however, the plan was unrealistic. Japanese industry was still in its infancy,
and exports to China were still very small  —let alone that capital exports were a policy
issue.  Visionary though it  may  be  considered  in  hindsight,  it  was  most  probably  an
ideological frenzy of its authors.
The plan is however taken up again only a few years later, and this time in a very
different political and economic setting. As we have seen in earlier chapters, the adoption
of the gold  standard was  a benchmark  as  it  symbolizes  Japan's  entry into  the  world
system as both an empire and a trading nation. This is an important step in the history of
Japanese capitalism, and even more so because it  also highlights its peculiar position in
Asia.  At  least  for  Japanese  exporters  —Namikata  refers  to  them  as  Japanese
'bourgeoisie'—30 the  gold  standard  was  a  Janus-faced  achievement.  Especially  the
Kansai-based   spinning  companies,  from  the  outset  oriented  versus  the  markets  of
Southeast Asia, now faced formidable export disadvantages. At a time when silver prices
were steadily declining, their products were at risk of being priced out of the market due
to  exorbitant  transaction  costs  for  Chinese  importers.  Around  1900,  one  thus  finds
numerous opinion pieces and sollicitations for 'financial institutions concerned with trade
towards silver countries, not only to [further the interests of] the spinning industry, but to
the advantage of all commercial and industrial interests towards China'.31 The arguments
were  substantial.  In  1898,  Japanese  commerce  with  China  represented  more  than
¥100,000,000 (three fifths hereof were exports), or approximately a quarter of the Japan's
total trade volume (estimated at ¥420,000,000). Japanese exporters thus understandably
stressed that China 'represents an enormous market for our export products, among which
29 Namikata Shwichi xvyz, n
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nihon shokuminchi
kiny seisakushi no kenky (study into the history of financial policies versus Japan's
colonies) (Tokyo, 1985), p. 56.
30 Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kiny seisakushi no kenky, pp. 120ff.
31 Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kiny seisakushi no kenky, p. 123.; p. 122 contains a
useful overview of proposals related to a Sino-Japanese bank.
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textiles are the most important'.32 Although the Yokohama Specie Bank was formally in
charge of foreign trade,  it  de facto concentrated on trade with Western countries (i.e.
countries on the gold standard). In 1894, it  had done 94.9 percent of its business with
Europe and the United States, and only 5.0 percent with China.33
Interestingly,  it  was  initiative  on  the  side  of  the  zaibatsu that  prompted  the
government  to act. Their fates partially  bound up with Japanese exporters though their
activities  in  shipping  and  international  trade,  zaibatsu capitalists  had  submitted  their
'Proposal for the Expansion of Far Eastern Sealanes and the Establishment  of a Sino-
Japanese Financial Institution' (Łno)
as early as 1899. Its contents show several marked differences with proposals from the
spinning industry, which must be explained by the different nature of their activities and
interests. Put simply,  zaibatsu demands were much more strategic in nature. Typically,
the aforementioned proposal notes how expanded Japanese presence in China after 1895
had not  resulted in  a  commensurate flowback  in  economic  gain and an extraction of
special interests. Concretely,  it  argues that Japanese financial presence in China  would
not only accelerate the penetration of the Chinese Hinterland by Japanese producers, and
thus give them an advantage over the producers of the Western powers. It would also
translate  in  lucrative  projects  in  the  fields  of  railway  construction  and  mining.  One
understands  that  this  considerably  affects  the nature  of the  institution proposed.  The
zaibatsu industrialists envisaged an institution that was as much an investment bank as a
commercial institution, and a device for wrenching concessions from the weaker Chinese.
It was a veritable blueprint for a colonial bank. 
Even  more  importantly,  this  idea  resonated  with  policy  circles  in  Tokyo.
Confident because of the Sino-Japanese war indemnity, several politicians took the Sino-
Japanese  Bank  proposal  towards a fullfledged  real estate  bank,  with the sole  aim  of
investing in railroad building and mining. Later, in a grand scheme for the establishment
32 Cited in: Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kiny seisakushi no kenky, p. 123; cited after
an original request by the presidents of severl of Japan's formost spinning companies.
33 Hijikata Susumu ,  ¡ yokohama sh¢kin gink¢ (Tokyo, 1980), esp.
pp. ?????????
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of so-called  Far Eastern Trading Bank (£¤¥¦ ¡), the Japanese government was
urged to expand its political leverage by deepening its commercial interests.34 This was in
many  ways  a  crucial,  if  possibly  troubling,  realization.  Not  only  does  it  highlight  a
profound awareness of the modern imperialism  that  dominated Western dealings  with
China (and as such foreshadows Japan's own experiment  with 'yen diplomacy').  It also
brings to the fore an important trait of Japanese policy making constituency at the time:
its close attention to the long-term strategic interests of big business,  often even to the
disadvantage  of  the  smaller  but  nevertheless  important  exporting  industries.  Early
advocates of pan-Asianism found the objectives of the former remarkably fitting to their
dream of a Japan-led Asian order (¤§¨©ª), and effectively neglected the demands
of the latter. As Namikata does not fail to indicate,  the spinning  organizations reacted
'coolly'  to the political hijacking of their original request for easier access to the China
market.35  Later we will study similar policies and their consequences in greater detail.
IV.
Even  amidst  intensifying  power  competition  in  China  in  the  early  twentieth
century,  however,  the  Katsura  Cabinet  (1901-1905)  was  unable  to  act  upon  the
aforementioned  requests,  and  have  a  Sino-Japanese  Bank  materialize.36 This  does
certainly not mean that China disappeared from Japan's financial radar. As a matter of
fact, the years after the Russo-Japanese war witnessed a dramatic increase of Japanese
investments  into  China.  Whereas,  in  1902,  the  latter  occupied  an  insignificant  0.1%
(approx. $1,000,000) of total foreign investment  in  China,  its share rose to 13,6 % or
$220,000,000 in  1914.37 These numbers  need, admittedly,  a great  deal of nuance  and
34 Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kiny« seisakushi no kenky«, p. 131.
35 Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kiny« seisakushi no kenky«, p.132-133.
36 For an overview of proposals, see: Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kiny« seisakushi no
kenky«, p. 139.
37 These percentages and numbers are taken from: Charles Frederick Remer, Foreign
Investments in China (New York, 1933), p. 76. Apparently, Remer remains an important
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clarification. First and foremost, Japanese investments in China represented the bulk of
Japanese investment abroad —this is in sharp contrast with the much diversified foreign
investment  portfolios  of the Western powers. Strictly speaking,  a plain  comparison of
Japanese investment with that of the other colonial powers is therefore quite impossible.
But even then, the growth is remarkable, even more so if one considers the vast
share  of state  capital  ( ¬­®¯ )  involved,  especially  through the  branches  of the
Yokohama Specie Bank (YSB). Since the Sino-Japanese Bank plan had been aborted, the
former was given extra facilities for trade with China,  among which a China exchange
fund (°¬±²® ) to finance cotton exports.38 Later, this policy was modified.  As
Taira Tomoyuki has correctly indicated, the crux of YSB's post-1900 activities in China
resides in  the decision of the  Bank of Japan to upholding  Japan's newly adopted gold
standard.39 In order to do so, the BOJ had decided in 1903 to strictly limit  its supply of
cheap capital to the YSB. This sudden cut in its liquidity obviously posed problems to
YSB's smooth functioniong: it had to find ways to replete its operating funds. It came up
with an astonishing,  yet  risky series  of solutions.  First  of all,  it  reserved a part of its
'China exchange fund' (which constituted a part of the BOJ's cheaply supplied money)40
to  fulfil  its  obligations  vis-à-vis  Western banks.  Second,  it  resorted  to  a  strategy of
reference, also to Japanese researchers. Compare, for instance: Kokka shihon yushutsu
kenky³kai ¬­®¯´µ
¶·
¸
, ¹¯º®¯´µ»
¼
°¬
½¾
º
¶·
nihon no
shihon yushutsu -tai ch«goku shakkan no kenky« (Tokyo, 1986), esp. p. 4. Remer also
provides a detailed analysis of Japanese investments from 1897-1930: Remer, Foreign
Investments in China, pp. 408-553. For an early history of foreign financial encroachment
in China, see: Theodore William Overlach,  Foreign Financial Control in China (New
York, 1919).
38 These extra facilities were grants of ¥3 million and ¥10 million, in resp. 1897 and
1899. Helpful remarks in this respect can be found in: William D. Wray, 'Japan's Big-
Three Service Enterprises in China, 1896-1936', pp. 31-64 in Peter Duus / Ramon H.
Myers / Mark R. Peattie, The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895-1937 (New
Jersey, 1989), esp. p. 34-38. Interestingly, this otherwise excellent collection does not
include a paper on the Nishihara loans, or the pan-Asianist aspirations of the Teraauchi-
Cabinet.
39 Taira Tomoyuki ¿
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izen no tai-ch«goku shakkan to t¢shi shutai, p. 13-49 in Kokka shihon yushutsu
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shihon yushutsu -tai ch«goku shakkan no kenky« (Tokyo, 1986).
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collecting  deposits  through its  international  branches.  In China,  especially  its  recently
opened Tian-jin ÌÍ and Beijing branches were exceptionally instrumental in collecting
deposits.  Apart  from the money  they used  for  their  day-to-day  lending,  these  banks
channeled deposits to the Shanghai branch. There, it was partly used for so-called chop-
loans extended to the local micro-banks  (ÎÏ ),  in  an effort to control the Shanghai
capital market.41 The remaining share was used to buy exchange bills that were payable to
YSB's London branch Ðthe heart of its operations as an international exchange bank.
This was only the start of the monetary alchemy. At the same time, YSB engaged
in large scale (and at first  sight rather paradoxical) lending in China.  This strategy was
fuelled  by  a  newly  developed  political  interest  in  what  was  referred  to  as  'weapons
independence' (ÑÒºÓÔ), or, in 21st century parlance, 'indigenization' (¬ÕÖ ) of
military  technology  and,  more  broadly,  technologies  associated  with  heavy
industrialization.42 Most prominently,  this translated in attempts at a stronger economic
grip on countries that were relatively close to the Japanese mainland. Its effect on YSB's
China-portfolio  was direct  and enormous. In the period between 1906 and 1914, YSB
invested agressively and almost exclusively in China's mining sector. In efforts to sustain
lending in  the face of German competitition,  in particular for the strategic objective of
developing  the  Han zhi  ping  (Hanyehping)  Coal and Iron Company (×ØÙ ),  YSB
would  go at  great  lengths;  in  several  cases,  the Japanese  government  guaranteed the
loans; in other instances, it even provided direct funding.43 In total, 26 loans materialized
40 The fund was ultimately liquidated in 1913. Source: Taira Tomoyuki, dai 1ji taisen
izen no tai-ch«goku shakkan to t¢shi shutai, p. 20.
41 Compare: Nishimura Shizuya Ú
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îï
zai-shanhai gaikoku gink¢ to genchi gink¢,
1890-1913: choppu ro-n no mekanizumu, in ðñò
ó
35: 3 (1998), pp. 1-19 . 
42 For a very good account in English, see, Richard J. Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong
Army": National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan  (Ithaca &
London, 1994), esp. pp. ?????????????????.
43 See: Marius B. Jansen, 'Yawata, Hanyehping, and the Twenty-one Demands', The
Pacific Historical Review 23:1 (February 1954), pp. 31-48;  Remer, Foreign Investments
in China, pp. 439ff. For a wider argument on the importance of subsidies in Japanese
economic growth, see: Herbert M. Bratter, 'The Role of Subsidies in Japan's Economic
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(10 for  the Hanyehping  Coal and Iron Company;  Remer  estimates their  total amount
around $15 million), some of which of an unprecendented size.
[fig. 1: YSB loans in China; see Taira Tomoyuki, dai 1ji taisen izen no tai-ch«goku
shakkan to t¢shi shutai, p. 18-19]
Together with the bank's eventual entry into the international China Consortium (1913),
these loans heralded a new era: by 1914, China  had become 'the propelling  power of
YSB's exchange cycle [±²®ôõºö÷ø]'.44 Important for the coming discussion,
it had also become the stronghold of Japan's 'political' loans to China,45 even though the
Japanese share of e.g. the Reorganization loan was not issued in Japan.46
Development', Pacific Affairs 4:5 (May, 1931), pp. 377-393. On Japanese multinational
undertakings at the time, see: Mira Wilkins, 'Japanese Multinational Enterprise before
1914', The Business History Review 60:2 (Summer, 1986), pp. 199-231. 
44 Taira Tomoyuki, dai 1ji taisen izen no tai-ch«goku shakkan to t¢shi shutai, p. 20;
square brackets mine.
45 This is obviously especially so because of YSB's entanglement in the China
Consortium, and its handling of Japan's share of the Boxer indemnity. The principal of
the Boxer indemnity obligation to Japan was $24.5 million on January 1, 1902, before
payments began. Another clearly instance of YSB's political lending was its obligation in
the context of the Reorganization loan to China (1913, cf. supra). The loans's total
amount was £25 million, the Japanese share of which was £5 million (roughly equivalent
to ¥50 million). Other overtly political loans were a ¥2.5 million and ¥10 million, both to
the Chinese Ministry of Communications (ù¬úûüýþ).
46 Remer makes the following insightful comment:
'While it is true that the legal obligation to make payment to the Yokohama Specie bank
exists, it is also true that the whole of the japanese share of the Reorganization loan was
issued outside of Japan. It is unusual [...] for an legal obligation to exist to pay a bank in
one country when the whole of the funds have come from investors in other countries
[...]. The explanation for such transactions lies in the political field. Concerning the
Japanese share of the Reorganization loan, the fact is that the funds came from England,
France and Germany, and that the payments of the service of the loan were made through
the Yokohama Specie Bank and through the banks in these European centers to investors
in England and on the continent of Europe. Upon the principle of place of issue the
Japanese had no share in the loan. [...] As a matter of fact, the financial transactions
connected with the Reorganization loan probably meant a transfer of funds from Europe
to Japan rather than from Japan to China.' 
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V.
The  above  formulation  might  give  the impression  that  'political'  loans  can be
distinguished  from other types of loans,  as,  for instance,  'economic'  ones.  As one will
understand  from the introduction,  any such distinction  is  problematic  at  best.  It  was,
however,  the  rhetorical  strategy  explored  by  a  host  of  Japanese  policy  makers,
bureaucrats  and  businessmen,  especially  after  1914  —which,  as  said,  marks  the
beginning  of  a  boon for  Japan's  industries.  It  is,  as  well,  the  context  in  which  we
encounter the protagonist of later financial negotiations with China.
Although Nishihara Kamezß is mainly known as the middleman for the series of
Japanese loans to China this chapter deals with, he has a pre-history that is not unrelated
to the ominous 'Nishihara loans'. His early life, documented in his —largely self-serving
— autobiography is not of immediate concern here.47 Much more important, however, are
his activities in Korea. Nishihara, in his own words a 'restless wanderer', arrived in Korea
for  the third  time  in  1904, this  time  with the intention of settling  there.  As  so many
Japanese,  his  travel  was motivated  by both a dream of easy profits  as a paternalistic
desire to work with the Koreans. What distinguished him from so many others, however,
was his extraordinary penchant for social networking. A natural 'political fixer',48 he soon
found  himself  acquainted  with  many  members  of  Korea's  pro-Japanese  political
establishment. His appointment as adviser (  sdanyaku) for the Korean chamber
of commerce in 1905 is illustrative of his career. At the chamber, he lobbied for an active
Korean voice in Japanese policy versus the peninsula. Typically,  he was in the forefront
Remer, Foreign Investments in China, p. 433 (italics mine).
47 Nishihara Kamezß 

, 	


 

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
yume no shichij
yonen -Nishihara Kamez jiden (Tokyo, 1965), esp. pp. 3-30. Duus provides an English
summary of Nishihara's youth in his study of Japanese expansionism on the Korean
peninsula: Peter Duus, The Abacus and the Sword: The Japanese Penetration of Korea,
1895-1910 (Berkeley / Los Angeles / London), pp. 347-350.
48 After: Duus, The Abacus and the Sword, p. 347.
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of resistance against the Megata reforms (cf. Chapter ?????), which he believed to be at
the root of Korea's economic malaise.49 As so many other times in his live, it earned him
both friends  and enemies  —most  prominently  Megata himself,  who allegedly tried to
have Nishihara expelled from Korea.50
 This is not to say that Nishihara was anti-imperialist. After all, he later befriended
himself with the higher echelons of the Japanese colonial administration. He appears to
have been parrticularly close with Governor-General Terauchi Masatake , for
whom he acted as a policy adviser.51 Finally,  still  in  Korea, he also met Shßda Kazue,
then governor  of  the  Bank  of  Korea.  Yet,  he  was  not  the  mere  opportunist  several
commentators  have  made  of  him.  Instead,  Nishihara  was  an  ideologue,  and  the
quintessential  pan-Asianist:  a  staunch believer  in  the possibility  and  success  of Asian
unity,  and the need for the Asian people to work together as much as possible.  Asian
government  would have to follow the principle of Wang dao (): the rule of right,
rather than the (Western) rule of might. This explains as well his (and Tearauchi's) bitter
resentment of the policy of the 'Twenty-One Demands' (ﬀﬁﬂ) forced upon
China  by  the  ﬃkuma-cabinet.52 In  a  dramatic  depiction  of an  encounter  with  Count
Terauchi, Nishihara quotes the latter as saying: 'What the ﬃkuma-cabinet is doing, is the
49 Nishihara, yume no shichij yonen, p. 33ff.
50 Nishihara, yume no shichij yonen, p.35.
51 It appears that Nishihara earned the name of 'Terauchi's pearls of wisdom' ( 
	
!"#). Nishihara, yume no shichij yonen, p. 46.
52 This defining incident in the history of Sino-Japanese relations is wellknown and well
commented. See, in this respect: Paul S. Dull, 'Count Kato Komei and the Twenty-one
Demands', The Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 19, No. 2. (May, 1950), pp. 151-161; S.
N. D. North, 'The Negotiations Between Japan and China in 1915', The American
Journal of International Law, Vol. 10, No. 2. (Apr., 1916), pp. 222-237; Charles Burke
Elliott, 'The Shantung Question', The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 13,
No. 4. (Oct., 1919), pp. 687-737;  Marius B. Jansen, 'Yawata, Hanyehping, and the
Twenty-one Demands', The Pacific Historical Review 23:1 (February 1954), pp. 31-48;
Zhitian Luo, 'National Humiliation and National Assertion: The Chinese Response to the
Twenty-One Demands', Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2. (May, 1993), pp. 297-319.
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annihilation of eternal peace in the Far East. [This is] unforgiveable.  It may be easy to
invade territory, but it is not going to win you the hearts of the people'.53
Nishihara  was particularly  concerned with schemes  for  economic  cooperation,
and the need to develop a unified currency zone —the 'yen-bloc' ($%&'(). This idea
may well have been originated out of one of his very practical concerns: as a frequent
traveller along the borders of China, Manchuria and Korea,54 he must have been painfully
aware  how  the  congeries  of  different  currency  systems  and  petty  kinds  of  money
hampered  his  dream of a  self-sufficient  Asian  socio-economic  fortress.55 As  early  as
1912,  Nishihara  writes  a  pamphlet  entitled  'Currency  Unification  in  Manchuria  and
Measures for the Development of Trade between Japan, Korea and Manchuria' ()*+
,-./01
23
4
)56789 ), most probably commissioned by Korea's
government-general or the Bank of Korea.56 Admittedly,  the document did not contain a
radically new proposal. It echoes and appropriates the gist of earlier ideas with regard to
currency unification circulating amidst certain policy circles in the Bank of Taiwan and
the  Bank of Chsen. Yet it  also conveyed a clear sense of the so-called 'yellow man's
burden', i.e. the Japanese responsibility for uplifting Asia  and defying the West. 'As we
cannot expect from the newly established Chinese government to unify the currency in
Manchuria  overnight,'  so  he  explains,  it  is  up  to  us  [Japanese]  to  unify  Manchuria's
currency, further trade between Japan, Korean and Manchuria, and gradually expand our
economic zone to the south.'  The means therefore is Japanese paper money: 'It cannot be
difficult to circulate gold coins and paper money in the whole of Manchuria. There is no
doubt that this will  trigger a process that is  antithetical to Gresham's law [sic.!]: good
coinage  will  dirve  out  bad  coinage.  [As  a  result]  our  economic  zone  will  not  only
53 Nishihara, yume no shichij yonen, p. 72.
54 Namikata draws particular attention to this: Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kiny
seisakushi no kenky, p. 326.
55 He shared this experience with Shßda Kazue, who did a prospectus of China and
Korea in 1909 and published his findings in 1910: Shßda Kazue, :;<=
>
shinkan
many yoreki (report on wanderings through China and Korea) (Tokyo, 1910).
56 See: Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kiny seisakushi no kenky, pp. 326-333.
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encompass  Manchuria,  but  will  also  stretch  much  further,  beyond  Zhili  (Jehol)  and
Shandong (?@AB), and beyond the Yellow and Blue river'. 
Many a bureaucrat or politician at the time would have immediately realized the
plan's  explosiveness.  Was YSB not legally  prohibited to issue gold bills? And was the
BOJ not bound by the provision to keep its supply of convertible money in check with its
specie  reserve?  These  need  not  be  obstacles,  Nishihara  insists:  as  in  Korea,  Bank of
Chsen bills will naturally proliferate.57 The document thus marks the birth of the 'Korean
connection'  (C4D )58 of Terauchi,  Shßda and  Nishihara.  More importantly,  it  also
precipitates  Nishihara's  interest  in  the  grand  scheme  of  'Sino-Japanese  economic
cooperation' (3EFGHI nisshi keizai teikei): an objective that he envisaged through
the establishment  of a Sino-Japanese mining trust and the creation of a Chinese central
bank with Chinese and Japanese (!) capital.59 In his own words, and probably blind to the
irony, he proposed a 'Monroe-doctrine for East-Asia, or pan-Asianism' (BJ	KL&M
NO
P
BJQR).
VI.
57 Translated after the original text; also mentioned in: Namikata, nihon shokuminchi
kiny seisakushi no kenky, p. 326.
58 Apparently, Hayashi Gonsuke referred to them as such in a telegram of 1918 to then
Minister of Foreign Affairs Gotß Shinpei. See: Nihon Gaikß Bunsho, S
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Chdgoku kindai gunbatsu no kenkyd (Tokyo, 1973), p. 313; also
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59 emori Tokuko has correctly argued that access to iron and steel ore and monetary
influence was the ultimate rationale of the Nishihara loans. See, especially: emori
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rekishigaku kenkyd 419 (April
1975), pp. 36-51. She thus corrects the rather naïve view that the Nishihara loans were
inspired by a desire to establish friendly relations with its much bigger neighbor after the
predicament of the Twenty-One Demands. See, for this argument: Frank C. Langdon,
'Japan's Failure to Establish Friendly Relations with China in 1917-1918', The Pacific
Historical Review 26:3, (August 1957), pp. 245-258. 
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Although the Twenty-One Demands dealt  a severe blow to the vision of Sino-
Japanese cooperation, Nishihara's  idea were back on the table in  1916. Again,  it  were
international events that buttressed the choice for a proactive China-policy. Although the
United States had effectively stepped out of the China  Consortium in 1913, it  did  not
constrain its efforts to gain more influence in China. On the contrary, 1916 was 'the year
of American loans' (no), as Higuchi Hiroshi argued in 1939.60 In something
like  a lending  frenzy,  the U.S. provided money for canal projects in  the provinces  of
Shandong and Jiangsu 

 ($ 6,000,000), for several railroad works ($ 10,000,000); and
it  concluded a loan contract ($ 5,000,000) through the  Bank of  Chicago. Japan would
have to act swiftly if it did not want to lose the momentum of its position in China. This
was even more so in view of China's domestic politics. The sudden death of Yuan Shikai
had plunged China in the dark era of the warlords; their rivalries most certainly colored
their dealings with the foreign countries.
The  time  proved  right  for  Nishihara  Kamez.  Typically,  he  perceived  Yuan
Shikai 's death not as a crisis, but as 'divine providence' (),61 a situation that could be
made to Japan's advantage. It would have to play rivalling parties out against each other.
In his famous 'Outline for Opportune Economic Facilities vis-à-vis China' (pŁ




), he calls for the following steps to be taken:
1. to establish a concern for business investment [] in China, in order to acquire an
imperial economic base in China.
2. To establish provincial banks in the provinces of Dongshan and Zhili to issue gold
paper currency.
60 Higuchi Hiroshi 

,  
 ¡
¢£¤¥¦§
nihon no taishi t¨shi kenky© (Tokyo,
1939).
61 Nishihara erroneously uses the kanji ª«¬­. See: Nishihara Kamez®, ¯°±²
³
Nishihara Kamez¨ nikki (edited by Yamamoto Shir® ´ µ¶) (Kyoto, 1983), p.
129.
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3. To have  the  Japanese  business  investment  concern  provide  the  capital  of  the  above
provincial banks, not in the form of BOJ paper currency, but paper currency issued by a
'special bank' [·¸¹º; Nishihara obviously hints to the Bank of Ch»sen].
4. To  make  sure  that  the   provincial  banks  invite  'financial  advisers'  [ ¼ ½¾ ¿ ]
recommended  by the Japanese business investment  concern,  or  that such advisers  are
placed  in  the  finance  departments  of  the  Chinese  government,  or  in  the  financial
administration of the provinces.
5. To prepare for regulations that add gold coinage,  similar in form/weight/denomiation to
Japanese  coinage,  to  the  existing  system  of  silver  standard  money;  to  promulgate
regulations detemining the legal ratio of gold specie vis-à-vis the amount of paper money
to be issued. And...
6. ...to make sure that paper money can be exchanged for gold coins in the bank's reserve, or
for gold bills of a value identical to the latter; to put paper money on par with Japanese
currency.62
Nishihara's strategy, although never carried out in the above described form, must
have been immediately clear to any involved official at the time. By mentioning 'business
investments'  and  the  role  of  'special  banks',  he  obviously  exposed  a  schism in  Japan's
policy-making  constituency.  Indeed,  the  Yokohama  Specie  Bank (and,  as  such,  the
Ministry of Finance) had from the very outset been very critical of the Korea connection;
they  judged  an  independent  Japanese  financial  posture  in  China  as  reckless.  Now
Nishihara even sought to bypass the established framework of the multinational China
Consortium and YSB's 'political'  loans by setting the latter apart from the (imaginary)
category of  business  loans.63 From several  existant  communications  at  the  time,  one
easily  understands the frustration this  must  have  caused to YSB bankers and officials
62 After Nishihara KamezÀ Á
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63 Again Hayashi Gonsuke's description is apt: '[They want to] float political loans
masked as business loans'. Hayashi Gonsuke in a telegram in 1917 to Minister of Foreign
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from several ministries.64 However,  when the Terauchi  Cabinet  entered office  (after  a
showdown about a Russo-Japanese Convention which the military-bureaucratic faction in
Tokyo perceived as an opportunity for consolidating its advances into Asia),65 those who
stuck  to  the  multinational  China  Consortium  saw  their  position  compromised.  The
situation in China only exacarbated matters for them. When mounting costs of internal
war  expenses  force  China's  biggest  banks  —the  Bank  of  China and  the  Bank  of
Transportations ÝÞßà— to suspend convertibility and to block the withdrawal of
deposits (May 1916), the road to new China loans was wide open. During a series of six
(partially  kept secret) missions to China,  Nishihara would negotiatiate several loans on
behalf  of the  Japanese  government  —each  of them would  resonate  in  Sino-Japanese
relations for two decades to come.
For the Korea connection, however, this was, at least for now, the realization of a
dream that  had  seemed  shattered only a  while  ago. After  legal  arrangements  for  the
government securitization of the Japan Industrial Bank bonds were in order, ShÔda was
therefore  nothing  short  of  ecstatic.  Later,  in  1928,  he  magnanimously  claimed  and
explained in an ásaka shinbun column:
' “The day to separate the roots of the chrysanthemum will come soon” —. 
As it was immediately after the proposal for the China loans had passed the Diet
—which had been quite some work—, I chose the phrase 'separating the roots of
the chrysanthemum'  to convey my joy that the days in which Japan's economic
power would take root on the Asian mainland were approaching.'66
64 Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kinyâ seisakushi no kenkyâ, pp. 374ff.; Dickinson
provides a useful analysis of the role of domestic politics in Japanese foreign policy
under the Terauchi Cabinet. See: Frederick R. Dickinson: War and National Reinvention
—Japan in the Great War, 1914-1919 (Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1999), pp. 164ff.
65 See, for a history hereof: Dickinson: War and National Reinvention, pp. 138-152.
66 ShÔda Kazue, ã
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wo kataru: nishihara shakkan no ben – hinan no riyu ha nai, Õø
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1928.9.21;
online accessible via: http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/sinbun/index.html (Kobe University
Digital Archive) (ID number: 00800368); the citation can also be found in: Suzuki Takeo
ýþß  (ed.), ëìíî nishihara shakkan shiryÜ kenkyâ (Tokyo, 1972), p.
16.  The reader may know that ShÔda had used the metaphor for a booklet he published
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VII.
How  did  Terauchi,  ShÔda  and  Nishihara  proceed?  After  1916,  Nishihara's
activities both accelerate and intensify.When both kura and Co. and YSB turned out to
be unwilling  to lend to the Bank of Transportations (the latter had approached them in
1915),67 Nishihara  —now on a second trip to China— chose the side of Transportation
Minister Cao Rulin 


 in the new regime led by Duan Qirui. He signed a preliminary
loan for ¥ 5 million; the final contract with the three-bank group that would become the
Korea  connection's  favorable  vehicle  was  signed  on  January  20  1917.68 The  Japan
Industrial Bank put up ¥ 3 million, whereas the Bank of ChÜsen and the Bank of Taiwan
put up ¥ 1 million respectively. This 'First Bank of Transportations Loan' (ÙÒ	ÝÞß
à
íî) was the only of the ensuing loan series for which the banks took the entire risk;
it  was also repaid when it matured. In design, it was one of the most obviously colonial
ones. Gold currency notes of the same type as Japanese currency (and convertible into it)
would be issued and backed by Japanese gold notes. This would not only favor Japanese
commerce  at  the expense  of the  Western  powers;  it  would  also  a first  step towards
swallowing  China  into a yen-bloc.  Nishihara had long believed  that this  was the only
method  of overcoming  Japan's  financial  inferiority  versus  the Western powers.69 Not
unimportantly,  the loan contract also stipulated the appointment of a Japanese financial
adviser: as a matter of fact, after the conclusion of the second  Bank of Transportations
10 years earlier: ShÔda Kazue, 

å

kiku no newake (Tokyo, 1918)
67 Apparently, YSB management circles feared the upheaval that would be caused once it
was named in lending schemes apart from the multinational China Consortium. See:
Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kinyâ seisakushi no kenkyâ, p. 376.
68 For an English version, see:  John V.A. MacMurray (ed.), Treaties and Agreements
with and Concerning China 1894-1919 (New York, 1921) vol. II, pp. 1345-1346.
69 Nishihara KamezÔ in the appendix to the 'Outline for Opportune Economic Facilities
vis-à-vis China'. See: Nishihara, yume no shichijâ yonen, pp. 85-86.
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loan (October 1917), Fujiwara Masafumi ìÖ was dispatched to China, and was to
oversee the bank's operations.
1917 was, however, not simply the year of the first Nishihara loan. To the alarm
of Japanese expansionists, and the Terauchi Cabinet in particular, it was also the year in
which  the  United  States  entered  the  war.  And  how  it  did.  America's  new  voice  in
international affairs did not merely add to another shift of the balance of power in Asia. It
certainly  did,  but  it  also  marked the introduction of a  vocabulary that  broke with the
conventional power political rhetoric of the old European powers: the concepts of peace,
cooperation and unilateralism —if not in substance, then at least in form.70 Thus, when
president  Woodrow  Wilson  invited  all  neutral  countries  to  severe  relations  with
Germany, this also affected Japanese relations with China.  The Chinese, after all,  were
promised considerable financial assistance if they chose to ally themselves closely with
the  United  States.  For  the  Terauchi  Cabinet's  foreign  policy,  the  timing  of  this
announcement could not have possibly been worse.
Realizing that Japan was steadily loosing its foothold in China, Nishihara traveled
for the third time to China, in an effort to secure that China's entry into the war would be
regarded as to Japan's  credit.71 China consequently severed relations with Germany on
March 14.72 Negotiations for the 'Second Bank of Transportations Loan' (ÙÚ	ÝÞß
à
íî )  were infinitely  more  difficult.  More importantly,  they highlight  Nishihara's
character as a true visionary,  if  a militarist  one. This time,  he had to come up with a
scheme that had to turn out more lucrative to the Chinese than the one-time ¥ 5 million
loan.  Unbounded  by ambition,  he  proposed a  loan  that  was  four  times  bigger:  ¥  20
million for securing Chinese participation in the Great War. This was not all. In his talks
70 For a sound explanation of the impact of the U.S.' entry into the war on Japanese
foreign policy at the time, see: Dickinson: War and National Reinvention, pp. 176-179. I
am however skeptical towards Dickison's tendency to take Wilson's vocabulary at face
value.
71 Nishihara vividly describes his meeting(s) with Duan Qirui in his autobiography:
Nishihara, yume no shichijâ yonen, pp. 140-145; Namikata provides a good analysis of
the evolution in Nishihara's line of thought. See: Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kinyâ
seisakushi no kenkyâ, p. 383.
72 Dickinson: War and National Reinvention, p. 169.
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with  members  of  the  Duan-clique,  he  also  created  the  contours  of  a  debate  (and
consequent policy) that would only come to maturity in the 1930s.
The notion of an 'East-Asian self-sufficient  zone' ( ) was a radical
departure  from  all  former  foreign  policy  ideology.  Nishihara  insisted  on  promising
Japanese  assistance  in  helping  to  increase  Chinese  custom duties  with  the  aim  of
stimulating its domestic development and trade, in exchange for 'the abolition of export
tariffs on cotton, wool, iron and copper, and possibly two or three commodities'.73 It was
difficult not to see the political implications of such arrangement. Yet, Nishihara avoided
any  reference  to  the political  nature of this  loans,  insisting  on the borrower's  'sound
judgment' about the opportune application of the money (in the end, any 'reform effort'
was  postponed;  at  least  ¥  10  million  was  used  for  battling  the  rebellious  southern
revolutionaries).74 Domestically  too,  Nishihara  obviously  made  enemies.  Spinning
companies reacted viciously against the prospect of higher Chinese custom duties, as they
had  since  early  Chinese  requests for  custom reform.75.  In  attempting  to explain  their
necessity, Nishihara's arguments precipitate the grim realities of the 1930s, and echo the
German and Japanese militarist  belief  that  war was inevitable.76 After  this  war,  so he
envisioned, the world will fall apart in several blocs, 'be it in the form of economic wars
73 Nishihara in a telegram to Foreign Minister Motono;. in: Nihon GaikÔ Bunsho, ÕÖ×
ØÙÚÛ
TaishÜ roku nen dai ni satsu, pp. 635-640.
74 This is an estimate by Okabe SaburÔ 
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nishihara shakkan
wo ronsu. See: Suzuki Takeo (ed.), nishihara shakkan shiry  kenky! (Tokyo, 1972). esp.
p. 493. The original version of this 'top secret' ("#) booklet was circulated in 1931 in
the Japan Industrial Bank.
75 Compare: $
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1917.2.27-1917.3.4 ; online accessible
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, online accessible via: http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/sinbun/index.html (ID number:
00858791); $*+,-:; : &'JKLMN : (OP) =in >?@(AB
1917.4.13 ,  online accessible via: http://www.lib.kobe-u.ac.jp/sinbun/index.html (ID
number: 00858815 )
76 The notions of both Lebensraum and the 'East-Asian self-sufficient zone' are at the
same time the semantical anticipation thereof, and its acceleration ('self-fulfilling
prophecy'). 
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between the powers, or [in the form of] the unification of one British empire, or realized
through extremely protectionist measures ["QRSTUVW ]'.77 It would thus be in
Japan's  interest  to  form one such bloc  with China,m in  which  both Japan and China
would  equally  profit.78 It  will  not  be  until  September  20,  1917,  that  the  Japanese
government endorses its support for Duan Qirui.79 The familiar three-bank group signs a
¥ 20 million loan contract on September 29;  the total amount would be taken out of the
Deposit Fund (XY) of the Ministry of Finance.80
VIII.
Although  Nishihara  had  been  relatively  successful  in  buying  friendship  from
Duan, Cao, and other members of the Duan clique, he had not yet been able to build upon
this success and achieve his ultimate objectives: 1) the securing of (exclusive) access to
Chinese iron and steel ore; and, as a corollary hereof, 2) the propagation of the yen within
Chinese borders —two pillars for the establishment of an autarkic empire. This would be
on the table after the Chinese government  officially  applied to the multinational China
consortium for a second reform loan of £ 1 million in 1916 (the consortium had earlier
lent £ 2.5 million).81 The European countries, at the time caught up in the disaster of the
dragging  war  effort,  realized  that  their  once  preeminent  position  had  been  seriously
77 Nishihara in his pamphlet $
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=(May 1915). This pamphlet is
part of the Sh\da Family Papers ]^
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, Vol. 97; 18 (kept at the National Diet
Library of Japan). Italics mine. 
78 In the aforementioned shina kanzei mondai to nihon,  Nishihara uses the words b
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.
79 For a history of Japanese domestic political affairs and the confused events in China at
the time, see: Dickinson: War and National Reinvention, pp. 173ff.
80 For a history of the latter in English, see: Katalin Ferber, "'Run the State Like a
Business': The Origin of the Deposit Fund in Meiji Japan," Japanese Studies, Vol. 22,
No. 2 (September 2002), pp. 131-51. 
81 In Japanese, the loan is refered to as no
pqrst
.
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weakened.  Japan was the only country to furnish  the required funds;  consequently,  it
would acquire a dominant position in Chinese financial matters.
With  the  U.S  yet  unwilling  to  return  to  the  multinational  consortium,82 the
Chinese  government  too understood that  Japan  was  the source  to  turn to.  However,
Japanese negotiators, then of the ukuma Cabinet, insisted on securing any loan against
the revenue of Chinese land taxes; they also pushed for Chinese acceptance of a Japanese
advisor for supervising  its administration.83 Understandably,  the Chinese  side regarded
the former as too heavy a condition, because those taxes formed the pillar of the Chinese
national finance (and as such collateralizing them constituted a much more serious threat
to Chinese integrity and sovereignty). Yet, convinced that Japan was eager to provide a
loan, and realizing that its government was needing money nevertheless, the Chinese side
(in the person of Liang Qichao  vwx , China's  new finance minister) came up with a
revised loan scheme and conditions.  Carefully  avoiding reference to collateralizing  the
revenues of land taxes, it suggested to the multinational consortium to issue of a loan of £
20  million  aimed  at  administrative  and,  more  specifically,  monetary reform (August
1917); and it chose to 'invite' Sakatani Yoshio yz{|, Japan's former finance minister,
as an adviser. It envisaged monetary reform as follows:
1. Regulate monetary reform centrally and independently, put it under the supervision of the
prime minister or minister of finance, and invite one adviser from a member  country of
the multinational consortium [...].
2. Give the country's mint bureaus the sole authority [}~ kankatsu] with regard to matters
of monetary reform [...].
3. Pursue a gold-exchange standard; use ¾ of the loan [...] to establish an exchange fund [

].
82 Japanese negotiators and ambassadors understood that any American return to the
multinational consortium would severely damage Japan's position in China. Compare, for
multiple references: Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kiny seisakushi no kenky, pp. 401-
408.
83 The revenue of the salt administration had been used as collateral for the first reform
loan (cf. supra).
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4. Send ¼ of the loan to China [...].
5. first issue gold notes [ ] in the main trading ports and have them circulate on the
market, through tariffs, and in railway offices.
6. [...].
7. as collateral for the loan, use 1) the assets [] of the mint bureaus, 2) seigniorage and
[other] profits, 3) the profits of recoining sen
[...]84
As  convincingly  explained  by  Namikata,  it  must  be  understood as  an  almost
desperate attempt to avoid collateralizing the revenues of land taxes and using, yet apply
for  a large foreign loans nevertheless.85 The idea of a loan also  appealed to Japanese
negotiators.86 ShŁda almost immediately responded that Japan could pay up half of the
amount, i.e. £ 10 million,  or the astronomical amount of almost ¥ 100 million! He was,
however, far less enthusiastic about the gradual reform plan that the Chinese side applied
for.  After  all,  it  would mean the establishment  of a  gold exchange standard.  He and
Nishihara  envisaged  a  more  radical  connection  between  the  Chinese  and  Japanese
monetary systems than a yen-based monetary bloc ( ): a full-fledged yen bloc,
covering all countries in Japan's sphere of influence, and in which only the Japanese yen
would be legal tender ().87 Therefore, they would insist on the issuing of gold
bills ( kinken), which were to be similar to the ones issued in Korea by the Bank of
Chsen, and which were to circulate in China together with the latter ().
84 See: Nihon GaikŁ Bunsho, 
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85 Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kiny¶ seisakushi no kenky¶, pp. 403-405.
86 According to  ·mori Tokuko,  nishihara shakkan ni tsuite – tetsu to kin'en wo ch¶shin
ni, p. 47.
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IX.
That plan was discussed after an other dramatic shift in world events: the Russian
revolution,  and  the  consequent  fear  that  the  Bolshevik  revolutionary  spirit  would
'contaminate' other regions of the world as well. For Japan, this led, among others, to the
promulgation of the Munitions Industry Mobilization Act (ÒÓÔÕÖ×Ø, April 1918)
and the conclusion of the Sino-Japan Joint Defensive Military Agreements ( ÙÚÛÜÝ
Þ
Ò
ßàá
, May 1918). It were tumultuous times. In August 1918, Japan participated in
what had been established as an Allied Expeditionary Force to destroy the Bolsheviks. Its
military establishment even envisaged occupying a large area of Siberia  —a dream only
stopped short because of rice riots on the Japanese mainland, eventually causing the fall
of the Terauchi Cabinet.88
For  the  Korea  connection,  the  strategic  anxiety  surrounding  the  threat  of
revolution proved an opportunity. It is in exactly this period that Nishihara turned into the
prolific writer of pamphlets for which he is still known. After the aforementioned ¼
âã
ä
åæ
çè
Ù
é­(May 1917), he writes, in immediate succession, ¼êëìíÂîï
ðñ(November  1917),  òóôõö÷øùúûüñ(November 1917),  òôýñ
(December 1917), and ultimately the rather chimerical  òþß ðñ(January
1918)—elaborating  on the  desirability  and  concrete  meaning  of an  East-Asian  self-
sufficient  zone.89 Especially  from  ò
þß 
ðñ
,  it  is  clear  that  Nishihara
88 The rice price increase came at the peak of a post-World War I inflationary spiral that
affected most consumer goods and rents; undertaking the Siberian intervention further
inflamed the situation, as the government massively bought up existing rice stocks to
support its troops overseas. For a Western study of this fascinating period, see: Michael
Lewis, Rioters and Citizens: Mass Protest in Imperial Japan (Berkeley, 1990). See, for
more information on the rice riots: Ichibangase Yasuko 
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believed that only drastic (%&') financial support for China would be able to solidify
Sino-Japanese relations and bring consequent peace.
But how to deliver such drastic support and cover it up? The latter was the easy
part. The Korea connection urged the establishment of The Exchange Bank of China ((
)*+,
chka kaigy- gink-),90 which was to act as middleman between the Chinese
government  and the  three bank-group. But as the traditional three bank-group would
obviously not do, Nishihara proposed a country-wide 'capital trust' (./01) to
enable the raising of massive railway loans. In February 1918, the Terauch Cabinet paved
its way:  it  planned  the issuing  of government  secured 'industrialization bonds'  for  an
amount up to ¥ 100 million,  specifically to be used for foreign investment (this was the
instant Sh2da referred to as the moment that the roots of the chrysanthemum would be
separated,  cf.  supra).91 In  April  of  the  same  year  the  foreign  investment  trust  is
established  —it  was comprised of 18 banks,  among  which  even the Nishihara-averse
Yokohama Specie Bank.
Even then, tensions within the Japanese government remained. Above, we have
already indicated that the Korea connection had powerful adversaries. With regard to its
China policy, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs was especially antagonistic to the idea
of parting from the framework of the multinational banking consortium and push forward
reforms  in  a  matter  that  was  'insensitive'  to  international  pressure.  The  Ministry  of
Foreign  Affairs  did  furthermore  have  a  foothold  in  China.  After  China's  official
application to the multinational consortium for a second reform loan (cf.  supra), it  had
pressured  for  inviting  Sakatani  Yoshio  in  order  to  conduct  preparatory  surveys  for
monetary reform. Sakatani arrived in March (and returned to Japan three months later, in
June).92 He investigated China's monetary situation, the state of its mint  bureaus and so
90 Namikata refers to the bank's English name as The Chartered Exchange Bank of
China. Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kiny3 seisakushi no kenky3, p. 411. 
91 Suzuki (ed.), nishihara shakkan shiry4 kenky3, pp. 14-16.
92 I follow the discussion as presented by Namikata: Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kiny3
seisakushi no kenky3, pp. 414 ff. For official documents relating to Sakatani's dispatch,
see: JACAR(565789:;<=>) (Ref. A04018134600): ?@ABCDEFG
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on;  on returning  to  Japan,  he  submitted  several  reports  for  monetary  reform which
departed from Nishihara's line of thought in at least two radical ways: any reform was to
proceed gradually, and the end of the reform road was a gold exchange standard.
Interestingly, during Sakatani's stay in China, Nishihara travelled again to Beijing,
with the aim of amplifying his plan for the monetary and economic takeover of China by
means of the Japanese yen. As soon as April 10, he had the Chinese government and The
Exchange Bank of China reach an informal agreement contract for a telegraph loan (the
so-called H
IJKLM) —the actual  contract was signed on April 30.93 Soon hereafter,
however, the odds turn against Nishihara.  On his arrival in Beijing,  he must have been
stupefied to find that the Chijnese government had prepared the bill  with regard to the
issuing of gold bills, but stipulated that its denomination was 0.5% lower than the official
Japanese rate of ¥1=0.75 gram of gold —Chinese gold bills were to be set at 0.746 gram).
Apparently,  Chinese  officials  were less  mused by the idea  of a more or less  mingled
currency than had Nishihara! 
In Japan too, considerable doubts were rising with regard to the loans viability. Of
course the  Ministry  of Foreign  Affairs  had  opposed Nishihara's  plans  from the  very
outset. But there were problems with the commercial participants of the eighteen-bank-
trust as well.  For the likes of Nkura, Kurihara,  Mitsui ... notions of 'mutual benefit'  to
Japan and China,  or an 'East-Asian autarkic zone' were the proverbial painted rice cake
(OP gaby4),  a mask for expanding  their  managerial  grip  on China's  iron and steel
companies. This proved hard to enforce: one only has to think of Nkura's problems with
the  Fènghuáng steel  company ( Q R STU )  to  realize  the  gravity  of  Chinese
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93 Langdon, 'Japan's Failure to Establish Friendly Relations with China', p. 251.
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opposition.94 With the aim of their investments compromised, they naturally allied with
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
These  problems  effectively  spilled  over  into  the  negotiations  about  currency
reform, and led to a painful turning point in the relations between Nishihara and Sh2da.95
Nishihara,  for the sixth and last time in China,  insisted that Japan be forthcoming with
shipments of bullion  in  order to back Chinese  gold bills  to be  issued.  Being  back in
Tokyo, however, Sh2da realized how inopportune this had become. He must have felt as
being between a rock and a hard place.  Now it  was not only the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,  but also the Ministry of Finance, the  Bank of Japan and the  Yokohama Specie
Bank96 that vehemently opposed shipping bullion to China. For the future of Japan's own
finmancial situation, they reckoned that Japan could and should not possibly assist  China
in currency reform in that way.97 When  Sh2da replies to Nishihara that bullion shipments
are impossible, Nishihara writes in his diary: 'I have serious doubts as to whether finance
minister  Sh2da is  committed to  the friendship  and good of China,  whether  he  favors
economic rapprochement, and whether he desires the eternal benefits of both countries'.98
From there, the decision making process gets blurry.  Sh2da eventually reversed
his former decision and advised Nishihara to carry on with negotiations. The progress of
these negotiations was slow, but they were rapidly, indeed: frantically,  concluded. These
loans were:
1. The Kirin-Hueining Railway Primary Loan l
m
nop
qrst
  kikkai tetsud shakkan
maekashikin  (18 June 1918) — ¥ 10 million
94 Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kinyu seisakushi no kenkyu, p. 418. The discussion must
be seen in the wider framework of U.S.-Japan relations. The former had tried to contain
the latter through a steel embargo. See, in this respect: Jeffrey J. Safford, 'Experiment in
Containment: The United States Steel Embargo and Japan, 1917-1918', The Pacific
Historical Review 39: 4. (November 1970), pp. 439-451. 
95 This is well documented in:  Suzuki (ed.), nishihara shakkan shiryv kenkyu, pp. 20-22.
96 Suzuki (ed.), nishihara shakkan shiryv kenkyu, pp.21-22.
97 Namikata assumes that especially Sakatani was a catalyst in this decision.Namikata,
nihon shokuminchi kinyu seisakushi no kenkyu, p. 420.
98 Nishihara, Nishihara Kamezv nikki, pp. 262-263; 
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2. the Mine and Forestry Loan wl
txyz
p
q
  (2 August 1918) — ¥ 30 million
3. the Manm{  Four-Railway Loan |}~
nop
qst
 (28 September  1918) — ¥ 20
million
4. the Shandong Two-Railway Preliminary Loan 
onop
qrst
 (28 September
1918) — ¥ 20 million
5. the War Participation Loan 
p
q
  (28 September 1918) — ¥ 20 million,
which,  together with the earlier  loans,  amounted to the astronomical amount of ¥ 145
million!99 Interestingly,  3 of the loans had been hastily concluded on the last day of the
Terauchi  Cabinet.  When  confronted  with  the  question  why  these  loans  were  pushed
through, Terauchi will decline to provide an aswer...100 Once the foreign powers had been
alerted of the magnitude of the Nishihara loans, they conspired for the loans's immediate
termination.  Embarassingly,  the  Japanese  government  is  pressured  to  write  them off
completely,  with the exception of a token repayment of ¥ 5 million.Thus, ¥ 140 million
went unaccounted for, and was probably only to the benefit of corrupt Chinese officials;
moreover  it  had  protracted  China's  civil  war.  Yen  diplomacy generated  an  immense
antipathy for things Japanese. What was worse for Japanese financiers,  its international
status as a creditor nation had been tarnished. Of the built-up total foreign loan portfolio
of ¥ 980 million, 57% or ¥ 559 million was unrecoverable.101
X.
In the international press, the loans were consequently rebuked as vile  examples
of 'German'-inspired methods. 'Japan Ousts Pro-Hun', The Washington Post announced in
99 For documentation on the exact use of the loans, see: 

,  []Ł

 (December 1932); ,  ¡¢£¤¥¦; both
found at the Library of Congress.
100 This episode is related in: Suzuki (ed.), nishihara shakkan shiry§ kenky¨, pp.6-7 as
'the mystery of September 28' (©ª«¬­®¯°)
101 Referenties????????????
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the typical rhetoric of the day. Nishihara's actions had been a 'menace to American, allied
and Japanese comradship'. This comradship was, however, not to be considered broken.
Japanese and American cooperation had never been stronger (sic!),  assumedly because
both sides understood its importance:
'[T]he voice was Nishihara's, but the hand was the horrid hand of the Hun. [...] The part
played  by  Nishihara  was  a  true  copy  of  the  “script”  given  by  Bismarck,  through
Bleichroder  to Herr Justizrath Primker. Count Terauchi repudiated Nishihara when the
loan  scandal  was  aired  in  the  diet,  and the  count  is  a  soldier  and  a  gentleman  —a
Japanese, not a German.'102
Months  before  that,  Japan's  Ministry  of Foreign  Affairs  too had  attempted  to
mitigate any bad publicity associated with the China policies of the Terauchi Cabinet. On
September  12,  1917,  Imperial  Ordinance  No.  144  called  for  the  establishment  of  a
Special Finance and Economic Commission ±²³
´
µ¶·¸¹º»
, apparently in an
attempt to give MOFA its own finance-forum without directly clashing with Nishihara.103
A first mission led by Megata Tanetar¼ (then member of the House of Lords) was sent to
the United States,104 acknowledgeing that Americs's  financial position in the world will
102 Patrick Gallagher, 'Japan Ousts Pro-Hun —Disowns Tricky Financier Who Aids
Germans in Plots'. The Washington Post October 27, 1918.
103 Namikata, nihon shokuminchi kiny¨ seisakushi no kenky¨, pp. 388-384.
104 See, in this respect, Megata's biography: Yoshimura Michio ½
¾¿À (ed.), ÀÁÂ
ÃÄ
ÅÆÇ È
É
danshaku megata tanetar§ – j§ (The Biography of Baron Megata
Tanetar¼) Vol. 1 (Tokyo, 1938) [I have used the 2002 facsimile version], pp. 603ff. There
also exists a very rare English report of this mission: Japan. Special finance and
economic commission to the United States, 1917-1918, The Imperial Japanese
government’s Special finance and economic commission to the United States, headed by
Baron Tanetaro Megata (September 1917-April 1918) (Tokyo, 1918). Other members of
the commission were: Matsumoto Osamu Ê
ËÌ
, Sakaguchi Takenosuke ÍÎ
ÏÐ
Ñ
,
Baron It¼ Bunkichi ÒÓÔÕ, Dr. Hishida Seiji Ö×ØÙ, Yoneyama Umekichi ÚÛÜ
Õ, Yamashita YoshitarÝ Û
Þ
ßàá
, Koike ChÝzÝ âãä
å
, Matsumoto KenjirÝ æç
èéá
.
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remain dominant  after the war, and arguing that to strengthen the basis of cooperation
with her is tantamount to advancing the economic position of this Empire'.105
XI.
What  is  the  legacy  of  the  Nishihara  loans?  Without  exaggeration,  the  loans
became known as one symbol  of for the perversions  of prewar Japanese imperialism.
Okabe SaburÝ's 1931 description leaves no room for ambiguity:
'The bad reputation of the Nishihara loans. A subsidy for civil war; high treaon [êë].
The questionable credentials of the people involved. The waste of means. [The fact these
loans were] unsecured [ìíîïð]. The shameless search for profit.. Rogue loans [ñ
ò
óô]. The Nishihara loans have a very bad reputation, of course  in China and Japan,
but even in the public opinion of the Western countries which have no direct relationship
with them.'106
Yet,  throughout  the twenties  and thirties,  successive  Japanese  governments  sought  to
recover [...]
Indeed,  consequent  Japanese  cabinets  condemned  the  loans  for  their  recklessness.
Already in 1926, Inoue Junnosuke famoulsy said that
'[t]hese investments with the central and provincial governments of China —investments
running to several hundred million yen— resulted in a dead loss, and today Japan can
recover  neither the capital which she thus locked up nor one penny of interest on it. To
put the matter in a nutshell, I would say that foreign investment was not practised by this
105 The Imperial Japanese government’s Special finance and economic commission to
the United States, headed by Baron Tanetaro Megata (September 1917-April 1918. p. 4.
106 Introductory paragraphs to Okabe, nishihara shakkan wo ronsu. Square brackets
mine.
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country, and that such trifle investments as were effected might just as well  have been
thrown into the sea.'107
107 Inoue Junnosuke, Problems of the Japanese Exchange, 1914-1926 (Glasgow, 1931),
p. 37; also cited in: Harold G. Moulton, Japan: An Economic and Financial Appraisal
(Washington, 1931), p. 284; C.F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China (New York,
1933), p. 544.
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